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Abstract—Information systems enable many organizational
processes in every industry. The efficiencies and effectiveness
in the use of information technologies create an unintended
byproduct: misuse by existing users or somebody impersonating
them - an insider’s threat. Detecting the insider’s threat may be
possible if thorough analysis of electronic logs – capturing user
behaviors – takes place. However, logs are usually very large
and unstructured, posing significant challenges for organizations.
In this study, we use deep learning, and most specifically Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) recurrent networks for enabling
the detection. We demonstrate through a very large, anonymized
dataset how LSTM uses the sequenced nature of the data for
reducing the search space and making the work of a security
analyst more effective.
Keywords:
I. INTRODUCTION
Most organizations use Information Technology (IT) for
the enabling of their processes. The higher productivity and
process efficiencies gained with the use of information systems
come with a byproduct: the risk of individuals misusing
technology. We define the insider’s threat as the misuse or non-
authorized use of information systems by users (or somebody
impersonating them). Detecting the insider’s threat is a difficult
task, with the ever-increasing number, complexity and inter-
connectivity of information systems enabling many activities
in an organization. Although the user actions are usually stored
in electronic files or logs, it is difficult to detect malicious
activity just by reading them. Logs are usually very large files,
and contain myriad data points that are either irrelevant to the
analysis or normal operation of the system.
The experiments described in this study aim to demonstrate
how the use of deep learning, and more specifically Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) neural networks, can be used
for an effective detection of the insider’s threat. The proposed
approach is aligned with the conditions found in real world
settings, where very large datasets and finite resources are
prevalent - with a focus on short computational time and
probabilistic output. This study contributes to extant research
by articulating a practical approach that enables a structured
detection within constrained of time and resources.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II we depart
from neural networks foundations and move towards more
Identify applicable funding agency here. If none, delete this.
advanced concepts such as deep learning and recurrent neural
networks. Section III describes how we architect detection
through the selected hardware and software, followed by the
experiments in Section IV. We close the document with our
conclusions and suggested research streams in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The experiments described in this study are anchored in
computational and mathematical models. In this section we
explain the theoretical framework used and how it is applied
towards the detection of an insider’s threat.
A. Neural networks foundations
Neural networks are computational models used for clas-
sification and prediction. On the most basic form, a neural
network takes a set of inputs, or predictors, performs some
calculations on it and provides an output or outputs as the
result of the process. A simple neural network with one node
takes the inputs and generates the output based on weights
that it assigns to each of the inputs.
Fig. 1. A single neuron processing model.
In Figure 1, there are two inputs: x to denote a vector of
observations and b as the bias. The neural network assigns the
weights w and sums the resulting numbers. The results of this
operation are then entered into an activation function, which
is used to introduce non-linearity into the output. There are
three typical activation functions found in the literature. They
are depicted in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Activation Functions used in Neural Networks
If the activation function we use is the sigmoid (see Figure
2), the function calculation would be as follows:
yˆ = σ(w ∗ x+ b) (1)
where yˆ is the predicted value. The σ function is defined
as:
σ(z) =
1
1 + e−z
(2)
Interconnecting multiple neurons and arranging them in
layers is illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Neural Network with three layers.
For the neural network we define a loss function for one
observation to measure how close the prediction yˆ is to the
actual value y.
L(yˆ, y) = −(y ∗ log(yˆ) + (1− y) ∗ log(1− yˆ)) (3)
Equation 4 is a quantified metric on how close the prediction
is to the actual value observed by the neural network. For all
observations (i.e. training data with m records) we define the
cost function J as follows:
J(w, b) =
1
m
∗
m∑
i=1
L(yˆi, yi) (4)
A three-dimensional illustration of Equation 4 is depicted
in Figure 4.
The closest this number is to zero, the more accurate the
model is at predicting results with the given training dataset.
Thus, the minimization of Equation 4 is a mathematical
objective which is performed through an optimization algo-
rithm called gradient descent. Graphically this can be seen as
traversing the function in Figure 4 towards its global minimum.
Fig. 4. Loss function J mapped against w and b.
The slope of Equation 4 is calculated as
∂J(w, b)
∂w
(5)
The next values for w and b are calculated on each epoch
(forward and backward propagation) as follows:
w := w − α ∗ ∂J(w, b)
∂w
(6)
b := b− α ∗ ∂J(w, b)
∂b
(7)
Where α is known as the learning rate. The process by
which the gradient descent takes place happens through a
feed forward of data, with back propagation recalculating
parameters. The features are organized in arrays that the neural
network can understand (i.e., tensors). A tensor can be defined
as a container of data which can be considered as a ”bucket
of numbers” [12]. Tensors are the fundamental data structures
in deep learning models [6]. An essential tensor attribute is
its shape which conveys how the numbers are stored. A 0-
dimensional (i.e., 0D) tensor is a single number, a scalar. A
1D tensor is a vector of numbers. 2D tensor is a matrix, with
a 3D tensor being a cube. Tensors traverse the multiple layers
forward and backward as the estimation of the parameters take
place.
B. Deep learning and gated neural networks
A deep network is defined as a neural network in which
multiple layers exist. As more layers are added, the more
difficult it becomes to calculate the right weights; the sig-
nal becomes ’weaker’. This is sometimes referred to as the
vanishing gradient [19]. This is an important challenge given
that the weights are initially randomly assigned. It used to be
impossible to parametrize a deep learning network with back
propagation. The tools and techniques used in addressing this
challenge are labelled as deep learning.
Deep learning can be described as algorithms for feature
detection. This was a breakthrough made by some researchers
in the field - more notably Hinton from the University of
Toronto - in 2006. The basic concept is that each layer in
the neural network learns features. More specifically, the first
layer learns primitive features like the edge of an image. Once
it has learned those features, they are fed to the next layer
where more sophisticated features are recognized. The process
allows for the deep network to recognize increasingly complex
features in the data [14].
A milestone was achieved in October 2012, when Hinton
announced that two of his students had invented software that
recognized objects with double the accuracy of their next com-
petitor in the Artificial Intelligence challenge called ImagiNet.
From that point on, significant progress has been made in areas
as varied as gaming, Natural Language Processing and image
labeling.
The neural networks described previously are typically used
with no conception of time or sequence dependency. However,
it is quite common that the values depend on preceding values.
A good illustration of this is Natural Language Processing.
Predicting the last word in the phrase ”I live in France, I
speak ...” may be considered a classical case where the data
in the sequence is essential to the prediction. This kind of
problems can be approached by using neural networks that
consider the preceding states, i.e., Recurrent Neural Networks
or RNN. Conceptually, an RNN looks at preceding states
for the output of the current observation. This is illustrated
in Figure 5, with the dashed arrows on the unrolled RNN
representing the preceding states flow.
Fig. 5. Recurrent Neural Networks
A fundamental principle is raised with RNN: how far in the
past should the network reach when assessing an observation?
The architecture depicted in Figure 5 will suffer from short-
term memory. As information gets passed to the next layer,
early information may be reduced or vanish entirely. To
address this issue, new designs were implemented, such as
Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) [16] and Gated Recurring
Units (GRU) [11].
LSTM neurons use a mechanism for regulating the flow of
information, namely gates [4], [15].The gates enable LSTM
to learn what data in the sequence is important, and what can
be discarded. An illustration of LSTM is depicted in Figure
6. The LSTM design uses two distinct activations: tanh and
sigmoid, as depicted previously in Figure 2.
The first step in the processing is the vector concatenation
of the preceding hidden state (ht−1) and the input to the
LSTM unit (xt). This tensor is then multiplied by the weights
matrix Wf , added the bias vector bf , and passed through a
Sigmoid activation function σ. The resulting vector is then
elementwise multiplied by the preceding cell state Ct−1. The
set of operations is referenced as the forget gate, with the
equation stated below.
Fig. 6. Long Short Term Memory - gates and operations
ft = (σ(Wf .[ht−1, xt] + bf )) ∗ Ct−1 (8)
In the next gate, we depart from the same input ht−1, xt
and move them through a Sigmoid activation:
it = σ(Wi.[ht−1, xt] + bi) (9)
And a Tanh activation:
Ct = tanh(Wc.[ht−1, xt] + bc) (10)
Ct is multiplied with it and added to the cell state coming
from the forget gate. This value is the new cell state and is
calculated with:
Ct = ft ∗ Ct−1 + it ∗ Ct (11)
The new cell state includes what information we want to
forget, as well as the information that is deemed important.
The final stage is the output gate. The first value calculated
uses a Sigmoid activation:
ot = σ(Wo.[ht−1, xt] + bo) (12)
Which is then multiplied by the cell state put through a
Tanh activation:
ht = ot ∗ tanh(Ct) (13)
Many different architectures have evolved from this LSTM
concept. Multiple LSTM stacked, or using bi-directional
LSTM have produced better results that single LSTM [13].
C. Keras
There are multiple deep learning frameworks that implement
the concepts discussed above. TensorFlow [8] is arguably one
of the best known framework, originally created by Google.
It works with a static computation graph, where re-training is
required when making changes to the architecture. A higher-
level API can be used on top of TensorFlow, making deep
learning development and prototyping more efficient. The best
known is Keras, which we select for this study.
A Keras model is composed of multiple layers connected in
sequence that progressively process tensors [3]. The followings
are some of the layers available.
a) Dense layer: These are the most common deep learn-
ing layers. In a typical Keras model, the dense layers uses
two attributes: the input shape and the number of units. In its
simplest form, the input shape is the dimension of the feature
vector. In Figure 3, the input shape is 3 and the number of
units of the first dense layer is 3 (since there are three neurons).
As more dense layers are added to a Keras model, the shape
of the tensor is not required anymore since it was defined in
the first layer. In Figure 3 the second dense layer only has, as
arguments, the number of units or neurons (i.e., 2).
b) Dropout layer: A common issue with deep neural
networks is overfitting. Using dropout is a technique that
can be used to avoid this situation. It consists of randomly
dropping units in the neural network during training [17]. To
add a dropout layer in Keras, a rate is used as parameter, and
that pertains to the fraction of units that are randomly set to
0.
c) Embedding layer: Frequently used in Natural Lan-
guage Processing (NLP), an embedding layer converts positive
integers into dense vectors. This is suitable to situations
in which the vocabulary set is very large, and a lower-
dimensional vector is more efficient for the processing of the
dataset.
d) Recurrent layer: There are multiple implementation
of recurrent networks in Keras, from the simple RNN to gated
units such as Gated Recurrent Units (GRU) and Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM) networks. LSTM is implemented in
alignment with the work by Hochreiter et al. in 1997 [?]. Many
other Keras layers exist, including pooling and convolutional
layers, which can be used for specific applications in text and
image processing.
D. Measuring success
A foundational element in the use of any prediction or clas-
sification problem pertains to how it is compared against other
models or a given baseline. The approach this study makes
to the research challenge – identifying the insider’s threat
through anomaly detection – is ultimately a classification
exercise: given historical sequenced data, is the observation
normal or abnormal (two-class). A classical way of evaluating
performance of a classifier is through a confusion matrix [10],
depicted in Figure 7.
X + Z is the number of observations that the classifier
predicts as class A (i.e. probabilities higher than the threshold
Fig. 7. Confusion matrix for a binary classifier.
of 0.5). X are the correctly predicted, and Z were incorrect.
sensitivity is the ability of the model for correctly predicting
a class (true positives), and specificity of the classifier is its
ability to correctly predict the other class, i.e., class B (true
negatives).
sensitivity = true positive rate =
X
X + Y
(14)
specificity = true negative rate =
W
Z +W
(15)
Sensitivity and specificity of a classifier change as different
probability thresholds are used. A perfect classifier has a
sensitivity of 100% and a specificity of 100%. Plotting the
performance of a binary classifier is possible through a ROC
(Receiver operating characteristic) curve [10], as illustrated in
Figure 8.
Fig. 8. Example ROC curve for a binary classifier.
A very good classifier that separates correctly the two
classes would appear on the upper left point [0,1]. A very
bad classifier would be equivalent to a random draw, with a
curve close to the diagonal. The Area Under the Curve (AUC)
is usually used to represent the quality of a given classifier as
captured in a ROC curve [10].
III. APPROACH
This section articulates the context and decisions influencing
the design of the experiments.
A. Principles and constraints
Detecting the misuse of information systems by mining the
data contained in electronic logs is a challenging task. It is
specially difficult if there is no ”signature” or baseline of what
is considered a normal behavior. Experiments such as the ones
described in this work must follow as closely as possible what
exists in reality. Some of the constraints worth mentioning are:
1) No normality baseline: Data available in logs do not
have labels. The records just describe what is happening
in information systems, but is not classified as normal or
abnormal. This is a critical constraint we use as it is in
alignment with reality in which data is not pre-labeled.
2) Finite training and detection time: The identification of
an insider’s threat taking place is necessarily a time-bound
activity. Detecting the misuse of an information system may
be impractical if it needs too long to take place.
3) Very large datasets: Electronic logs are usually very
large datasets. The volume of information – irrespective to
the relevancy of the analysis – demands tools (hardware and
software) that is specialized and powerful.
4) Probability-based: Detecting an insider’s threat is not
an exact process. The objective is to improve the probability
of a human resource – e.g. a security analyst – effectively
and efficiently detecting the threat. A corollary to this is that
false positives or true negatives are acceptable as long as the
detection process is enhanced.
5) Inherent characteristics in the data: The algorithms and
computational statistics to be used must take advantage of the
nature of the data: whether is/is not parametrized, spatial or
sequential/temporal, categorical or numerical, etc.
B. Dataset
The paucity of datasets in the are of cybersecurity has been
a known issue for researchers. However, with the explosion
of digital data availability and remarkable interest in machine
learning, this is no longer the case. The Los Alamos national
laboratory in the United States has published a remarkably
rich dataset that can enable myriad research projects [9]. The
dataset is an anonymized, multi-device log captured through
the monitoring of servers, workstations and network devices
during 58 days of uninterrupted activity. The data includes
more than 12,000 users, using more than 17,000 computing
devices. Furthermore, the data includes actions taken by a ’red
team’, i.e., insider threat attacks in the network.
There are multiple log files that can be analyzed. Figure 9
depicts the relative sizes. As can be observed, the authenti-
cations log contains more than 1 billion records. It captures
the timestamp of the event, as well as the user and computers
involved.
For the purposes of this study, we select the authentications
file as our research focus.
C. Technology Stack
The processing of a very large dataset requires specialized
technology tools. The dataset contains approximately 1.6 bil-
lion records stored in flat files. We select Apache Spark as
the data analytics engine for performing the pre-processing
tasks: ensuring the data is suitable for consumption by machine
learning models.
Fig. 9. Los Alamos National Laboratory - log files created over 58 days of
monitoring.
Apache Spark [1] enables data analysis through multiple
modules such as Spark SQL and MLlib. As of the time of this
study, deep learning can be implemented in Apache Spark with
the use of a dedicated package [7] or through other methods
that make use of TensorFlow and Keras [18]. However, given
our intent on fast prototyping and experimentation, we select
Knime as the front-end tool utilized in this study. Knime [5] is
a modular data pipelining tool that enables implementation of
machine learning models with minimal coding. Both Knime
and Apache Spark (in its commercial form: Databricks) are
highly rated by industry, as captured in the Gartner magic
quadrant for data science and machine learning platforms [2].
In terms of the hardware infrastructure, a purpose-built
DGX-1 machine by NVIDIA is used. The DGX runs the
software described with Ubuntu server as the operating system.
Figure 10 depicts the overall approach, with the hardware
and software described. Please note the different processes to
be performed, and the hardware and software artifacts that
enable them.
Fig. 10. Architecture for detection of the insiders’ threat - hardware and
software
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
This section will be divided in segments in alignment with
the processes depicted in Figure 10, including: pre-processing,
encoding, batching, training, prediction and evaluation.
A. Pre-processing
The raw data is produced from the multiple devices that
are connected to the network. The data is anonymized and
collected in a CSV (Comma-Separated Values) format. This
first step is depicted in Figure 11.
Fig. 11. Creation of raw data from devices, anonymized into a CSV file
The raw data needs to be cleansed and invalid records need
to be either inputted or deleted (following list-wise deletion
best practices). The data must be transformed from string
into a suitable type that permits further manipulation. The
information provided in an authentication record includes the
user involved in the event prefixed with the letter ”U”. It
also includes both the source computer and the destination
computer, both prefixed with the letter ”C”. The numbers (1
to 5) in the left column of Figure 11 indicate the seconds in
which the events took place.
We proceed to inject into the dataset the ground truth,
or known records capturing the interactions from the red
team. This information is going to become essential when we
measure the success in identifying the insiders’ threat.
It is important to note that this information is only used
to assess the quality of the detection, but the action taken to
identify the red team do not make use of this data, in alignment
with conditions found in real-world applications where there is
no signature pre-defined. In other words, the approach taken in
this study is unsupervised learning – the deep learning model
architected does not receive which records are normal and
which ones are produced by the red team.
A last, but important pre-process performed is the deter-
mination of the date baseline. The timestamp value in the
raw data is a single scalar number capturing the number
of seconds since the start of the monitoring. Analyzing the
relative volume of data at different points in time, it is
possible to identify the day/afternoon/evening patterns, as well
as weekdays/weekends. We use this information to assign an
absolute date timestamp to each record, with the very first one
taking place the 1-Jan-2018.
B. Encoding
We now proceed to define an event. For the purposes of
this analysis an event is the representation of the unequivocal
behavior that the user is performing at any given time. A record
in the authentications log includes the event that takes place,
and the timestamp associated with it.
As it was discussed in Figure 11, the raw record comes
with the timestamp, user, source computer and destination
computer. A simple, yet complete event will, therefore, include
these three elements as U5080, C23, C24, and it represents
user U5080 authenticating from computer 23 to computer 24.
Once the events are generated, we proceed to encode them
in a data type that is accepted by a computational model.
In this study we refer to this task as dictionarizing. Every
unique event is assigned an integer number. Authentications
that happen at different points in time may be for a common
event – a user may login in the morning, log off at noon, and
then log back in for the afternoon.
Figure 12 depicts the encoding that takes place. In the
illustration there are 5 records, with a repeated event that takes
place at 10am and 11am with the index number 4.
Fig. 12. Encoding the pre-processed data.
It is important to note that there is a further step in the
encoding that is not described in depth, but nonetheless takes
place. The representation of each index uses one-hot encoding
when inputted into the deep learning model. This process
produces sparse vectors – long arrays of zeroes (0) with a few
ones (1). For simplicity and illustration, we do not include the
one-hot encoding in the depictions for this work.
The encoding we have performed translates a categorical
value (e.g. U5080-C23-C24) into a number that can be used
by the mathematical model. The total number of unique events
in the dataset is referred to as the vocabulary size. This encod-
ing does not capture the relationships between the different
events. The index chosen is arbitrary – usually following
some convention such as alphabetical order. It is possible to
index the data with meaningful numbers – for example by
performing feature engineering to calculate word embeddings
from the data. For simplicity purposes, we continue using
simple indexing in these experiments.
User Vocabulary size Highest event frequency
U737 812 1,905
U3005 182 3,102
U213 100 2,875
U1581 7 19
TABLE I
TENSOR CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED USERS
Table I displays two key indicators for four users. Vocabu-
lary size (i.e. how many different events exist) and the highest
frequency for an event. As can be observed, user U737 has
a larger quantity of unique events, whereas users U3005 and
U213 have a significantly lower number of potential events
that are more common (i.e. larger frequency). Further analysis
of the behavior is possible, but is considered out of scope for
the experiments in this study.
C. Creation of batches
The feature set produced in the encoding stage shall now
be converted into a data structure that is typical of deep
learning, i.e., tensors. A tensor is a multi-dimensional array
used as the foundational data structure in deep learning [6].
In a deep learning network, a tensor is moved from layer to
layer as processing happens. The creation of batches produces
the tensors that are fed into the model.
For the creation of the tensors, some design decisions are
required. Arguably the most fundamental design decision is
about the sequenced nature of the data. As can be observed
in the dataset, the information follows a temporal order. The
events defined in the encoding stage exist in a sequence that
allows for the prediction of subsequent events.
A second essential design decision is how far one needs to
look into the sequence in order to make the predictions. In
other words, does a sequence of x events effectively enable
prediction of y events. To maintain a parsimonious model, we
select y to be 1. In practical terms this means that our model
is a many-to-one, as it predicts the authentication that takes
place based on the preceding y events.
The process is illustrated with user U5080. Figure 13 top
shows 6 (un-encoded) authentication records, with 4 different
indexed events (a vocabulary size of 4) and a window of 3
events in the past. Figure 13 bottom depicts the creation of
the tensors with encoded events into numbers.
Fig. 13. Tensors created based on window of 3 events.
As it can be observed, this is a many-to-one example, where
the three precedent events are used to predict the fourth event.
The vocabulary size means that the sparse vector representing
event 2 is a 1D-tensor with a 1 in the 2nd position, and zeroes
in all others. In addition to this, deep learning networks are
trained with groups or batches of data. A batch of data in
this context pertains to the number of tensors being fed into
the network for 1 epoch (forward pass and back-propagation).
Different batch sizes will, therefore, impact the speed by which
an epoch takes place.
Figure 14 further depicts the tensor that is entered in the
deep learning model. Each of the events is represented by a
vector of size vocabularySize. The number of preceding events
considered is windowSize, with the batchSize as the number
of records entering the input. The shape of the tensor can be
expressed by windowSize× vocabularySize× batchSize.
The above designed tensor will be inputted to the neural
network for training. As discussed in Section II, we use
Fig. 14. Input 3D tensor into the deep learning model.
LSTM as the fundamental architecture for this study. The
deep learning model is depicted in Figure 15 using Knime
data pipelining tool [5] with two connected LSTM units and
a dropout layer for regularization.
It should be noted that the objective is to detect the red team
records (insider’s threats) that are injected in the dataset. We
select a particular user that has sufficient records for a deep
learning network, without requiring vast amounts of time for
training. Table II provides an overview of some of the users in
the dataset. The list includes 7 users, 4 of them have red team
records and the remaining 3 capturing users that are considered
normal. The explanation is as follows.
D. Training
Fig. 15. LSTM in sequence with dropout (model architecture).
U66 has a very large quantity of authentications in the
system, with a large absolute number of red team records
(118). However, the probability of getting a red team record
by randomly picking one authentication event from U66 is
extremely low at 0.0003%. We choose not to experiment with
this user given the very long training time that would be
required. U1581 is at the other end of the continuum. The
percentage of red team records is very high (9.4%) but the
number of records is too low to warrant the use of deep
learning.
U737 and U3005 appear more adequate for the experiments.
The number of authentication records is suitable for deep
learning, and the number of red team records suffices for
partitioning the dataset in training and validation segments
with the use of stratified sampling.
The normal users illustrated - U748, U4543, U213 - have
sufficient records to have meaningful deep learning training,
with no red team records present.
User Authentications Red team Probability
U66 3,372,907 118 0.0003%
U3005 44,150 36 0.1400%
U737 55,549 33 0.0093%
U1581 32 3 9.4%
U748 63,370 0 N/A
U4543 40,317 0 N/A
U213 40,315 0 N/A
TABLE II
SELECTED USERS WITH NORMAL AND RED TEAM RECORDS
User Training (h:m:s) Last batch accuracy Red team
U3005 0:04:11 50.00% Yes
U737 0:20:32 50.22% Yes
U748 0:34:45 49.34% Yes
U213 0:02:14 43.48% No
TABLE III
TRAINING RESULTS
Table III captures the key metrics for training the selected
users including the average training time for selected users
and the last batch accuracy achieved. The model was trained
during 30 epochs with a batch size of 5,000 records. For user
U737 – with a total of 44,439 records for training – this means
each epoch uses 9 batches for the training. The presence of
red team records is displayed, although this information was
not used in the training of the model. Figure 16 illustrates
that an accuracy of approximately 50.22% was achieved after
processing 270 batches during 20 minutes and 32 seconds.
It is possible to observe how the learning took place by
finding the minimum of the loss function shown in equation
4. The calculated loss per batch is depicted in Figure 17.
It is also possible to compare and contrast the training
time required for each user in the selection. Although U737
has approximately 30% more records than U3005 (Table II)
the training time was five times longer (Table III). This
can be explained by the vocabulary size. The sparse vector
representing an event for U737 has a size of 812 (Table I)
Fig. 16. Training performance for user U737
Fig. 17. Loss function per batch over training time of U737
Fig. 18. Last layer of the deep learning model for U3005 (dense softmax)
compared with a size of 182 for U3005. This can also be
observed in the training time for U213, which only took 2:14
minutes.
The presence of red team records did not create any differ-
ence in the training phase of the analysis. This is due to the
very few number of red team records that is present for some
users as per Table II.
E. Prediction
With the trained model, we proceed to predict the event
(user behavior) for each of the sequences. We follow the
typical percentages for training and testing data, i.e., 80% for
training and 20% for prediction (testing) [10]. As previously
mentioned, the partitioning of data uses stratified sampling to
ensure we have sufficient red team records in the prediction
dataset (i.e., 20% of the original dataset).
The output of the prediction yields the probability for each
event in the vocabulary. In other words, for each potential
event, a probability number is estimated by the model. We
use this probability as a key metric in the decision making.
For each input tensor composed of 30 events, we document
the event with the highest probability as the predicted event.
This dynamic is illustrated in Figure 18. The input shape (i.e.
the tensor created from the sequence) is fed into the LSTM
layers. The final layer for the output of the model is a dense
layer with as many neurons as the vocabulary size. In the
case of the user U3005, the vocabulary size is 182 (as per
Fig. 19. ROC curve for predicting one authentication event based on the
preceding 30 authentications
Table I). Thus, the deep learning model provides the different
probabilities it assigned to each of the outputs. In the case of
the illustration, the neuron 2 has the highest probability, and
is therefore selected as the output, i.e., the second event in the
vocabulary.
The above process is performed over the full test dataset
(the ’new’ data). In the case of U737, approximately 11,000
sequences are predicted. We can depict the results of the
prediction using the ROC curve as explained in section III.
Figure 19 shows the results. As can be observed, the deep
learning model shows how the model is suitable for predicting
the event when compared to a random draw. The Area Under
the Curve (AUC) for U737 is 0.717. Similar results are
obtained with other users as it is displayed in Table IV.
The results obtained validate that an authentication event
can be accurately predicted – but how is this related with
finding an insider’s threat (’red team’) taking place?
User ROC’s AUC Threat in 10 lowest prob. records
U3005 0.761 Yes
U737 0.717 Yes
U748 0.687 N/A
TABLE IV
PREDICTION RESULTS
F. Evaluation and adjustment
Although the ability to predict the event has been validated,
there is an additional process required for its application in the
detection of the insiders’ threat. We pay particular attention to
the probability for predicted events. It is possible to segment
the predictions as follows:
1) High probability, correct prediction: This is a case to be
expected if the model is performing well. A high probability
Fig. 20. Predictions with low probability vs. ground truth for U3005
Fig. 21. Predictions with low probability vs. ground truth for U737
for a predicted event should ideally result in the correct event
predicted when compared with the actual event. From an
insider’s threat perspective, this scenario does not provide
useful information.
2) High probability, incorrect prediction: This is the case
in which the model was quite certain that an event was going
to happen, but the actual event was a different one. This may
be a marker of an insider’s threat taking place – the model had
high expectations for an event based on the historical data, but
an anomaly took place.
3) Low probability, correct prediction: This is a situation
that does not happen often. The deep learning model was
not ’confident’ in the prediction (as indicated by the low
probability) but nonetheless it successfully predicted the event.
From an insider’s threat detection, this scenario is not relevant.
4) Low probability, incorrect prediction: This situation can
also be considered a marker for an insider’s threat taking place.
A low probability number conveys the message that the deep
learning model was unable to place the event based on the
learning from the training dataset. Since a red team record is
an anomaly, it is to be expected that it’d have a low probability
of detection and will end up being incorrect.
Figure 20 lists the predictions under the third scenario
articulated: low probability, incorrect predicted event. The
records selected are the ones with the 10 lowest probabilities.
The deep learning model failed to accurately predict any of
those 10 events, but they contain 5 threat events.
The same analysis is performed with U737. The lowest
probabilities are captured in Figure 21. The first 10 lowest-
probability records analyzed include 2 of the insider threat’s
records. This means that the heuristic used would enable
a security analyst to limit further analysis to the lowest
probability records for a user. For non-insider’s threats, the
security analyst will not find anything wrong, but the scrutiny
on a very limited number of records may significantly improve
the chances of catching the threat.
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude this work, it is relevant to review the principles
and constraints identified in section III, as they holistically
describe the strategy behind the experiments.
a) No normality baseline: The experiments described in
this study exist in alignment with the scenarios that would
be encountered in practice. An existent insider’s threat needs
to be detected even without knowing what normality looks
like for any given user. Thus, although the dataset does
provide labeled data, the experiments do not use it for training
purposes – no normality signature exist. The process described
is unsupervised in nature, using the ground truth just at the
end of the exercise to assess results.
b) Finite training and detection time: Throughout the
experiments we have demonstrated that the training of the deep
learning model – the most resource-intensive process in the
architecture – is performed in an efficient manner. For users
with low vocabulary sizes, the training takes place in under 5
minutes.
c) Very large datasets: The dataset used for the ex-
periments is very large, around 1.6 billion records in total.
To best utilize the available resources, each user is analyzed
independently – achieving a good balance between sufficient
data for deep learning and fast training and detection.
d) Probability-based: The approach designed uses the
probabilities estimated by the model for each of the predicted
events. Using this information, it is possible to decrease the
search space for the analysis – a security analyst would need to
analyze a small set of records in order to find an insider’s threat
taking place. The experiments demonstrated how this work for
two specific cases of U3005 and U737. The heuristic employed
was effective for the task: analysis of the high probability
events that were wrongly predicted, as well as low probability
events estimated by the model.
e) Inherent characteristics in the data: The
authentications information found in the dataset follow
a sequence in time. Using the historical information (the
preceding authentication events) it was possible to predict the
next event, and use the associated probability information as
markers of potential insider’s threats. Using LSTM proved
to be a suitable architecture for detection, since it takes
advantage of the sequenced nature of the data to find the next
event expected.
There are multiple new research streams that may prove
useful for researchers and applicable to practitioners. We
describe two of them:
f) Use of word embeddings: the encoding process as-
signed an integer number (an ’index’) to the events under
analysis. This was a required step in order to feed the data to
a computational model. However, each index exist indepen-
dently of the other ones. I.e., event ”4” and event ”16” may
be related in some way, but the encoding did not reflect that
relationship. A potential approach that could assign meaning
to the encoding is the use of word embeddings. Algorithms
such as Word2Vec can assign meaningful numeric vectors to
each event, which would open a very rich discussion on inter-
event relationships and how they may add value to the insider’s
threat detection processes.
g) Transfer learning: The approach taken in this
research used Keras models trained by user. It is possible
to contemplate that a Keras model trained on one user may
be relevant for another user. This is only feasible if the
encoding is common to all users: i.e. event ”4” for one user
is the same event ”4” for another user. Under this scenario,
it is possible to think that insights for a sequence of events
may be usable from user to user. The immediate impact
of this approach is that the vocabulary size would become
significantly larger in order to include all events for any user
– impacting significantly some of the principles discussed
previously.
The detection of an insider’s threat taking place is a rich
ground for the use of deep learning. The experiments described
here provide a glimpse of the value that machine learning
brings to the detection of the insider’s threat.
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